About the Course
One of the most interesting and important developments in social science since 1970 has been the "discovery" of a consistent economic logic underlying the great common law subjects of property, contract, tort and crime, the thousand-year-old bedrock of the English and American legal systems. Property and contract provide the institutional scaffolding that makes free exchange in markets possible, while the liability systems of tort and crime appear to mimic market exchange in areas of human activity where free exchange itself, for well-defined reasons, is not possible. This course seeks to expose this underlying economic logic through the close investigation of a series of paradigmatic problems and examples in light of some simple but very powerful economic ideas. The course assumes no prior background in economics or law, and begins with an introduction to the basic concepts of property, exchange, efficiency and externality. On this foundation, specific topics in the law, including property, tort and crime, eminent domain, intellectual property and criminal procedure, are considered. Each group of lectures will elaborate on a different concrete problem or example to suggest the range of legal issues and questions to which economic reasoning can be productively applied. The ideas and modes of analysis developed in the course are not difficult or mysterious, but the questions of interpretation and policy that they raise about a subject that affects everyone are challenging and provocative.
About the Instructor(s)
Course Syllabus
Part One: Property (3 lectures)
Locke and Bentham; An Infinity of Rights; Creating New Property
Part Two: Exchange and Efficiency (6 lectures)
Siren Testing; "It Doesn't Matter Who Wins;" The Coase Theorem;
Posner's Corollary; Stacks of Flax; Owning History
Part Three: Externality (6 lectures)
Markets for Goods; Markets for Bads; Transaction Cost; Property and
Liability; Planning Stations; A Certain Kind of Justice
Part Four: Markets for Crimes (6 lectures)
Retribution and Deterrence; Torts and Crimes; The Costs of Crimes;
Efficient Crimes; Pricing Crimes; Sentencing Standards
Part Five: Property and Utility (3 lectures)
Eminent Domain and the Police Power; Erasing the Bright Red Line;
Locke and Bentham Again
Part Six: Property and Technology (6 lectures)
The Competition of Technologies; Intellectual Goods; Locks and Keys;
Copyright; Fair Use Then; Fair Use Now
Part Seven: Plea Bargaining (3 lectures)
What It Is and How It Works; The Court Discovers Plea Bargaining;
"An Essential Component"
Part Eight: Comparative Criminal Procedure (3 lectures)
Plea Bargaining in England; Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems;
European Plea Bargains?
Locke and Bentham; An Infinity of Rights; Creating New Property
Part Two: Exchange and Efficiency (6 lectures)
Siren Testing; "It Doesn't Matter Who Wins;" The Coase Theorem;
Posner's Corollary; Stacks of Flax; Owning History
Part Three: Externality (6 lectures)
Markets for Goods; Markets for Bads; Transaction Cost; Property and
Liability; Planning Stations; A Certain Kind of Justice
Part Four: Markets for Crimes (6 lectures)
Retribution and Deterrence; Torts and Crimes; The Costs of Crimes;
Efficient Crimes; Pricing Crimes; Sentencing Standards
Part Five: Property and Utility (3 lectures)
Eminent Domain and the Police Power; Erasing the Bright Red Line;
Locke and Bentham Again
Part Six: Property and Technology (6 lectures)
The Competition of Technologies; Intellectual Goods; Locks and Keys;
Copyright; Fair Use Then; Fair Use Now
Part Seven: Plea Bargaining (3 lectures)
What It Is and How It Works; The Court Discovers Plea Bargaining;
"An Essential Component"
Part Eight: Comparative Criminal Procedure (3 lectures)
Plea Bargaining in England; Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems;
European Plea Bargains?
Recommended Background
No background is required; all are welcome!

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